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We examine the role of institutional investors’ investment horizon on the information content 
associated with dividend announcement surprises in the “dividend-reappearance era”. We find 
that the presence of institutional investors negatively affects the announcement period 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which suggests that institutional investors reduce 
information content of dividend announcements. This result is primarily driven by the fact that 
institutional investors, especially the not-short-horizon investors, do not prefer dividend surprises 
– which leads to lower announcement period CAR. We do not find support for institutional 
investors’ informed trading argument. Our study reveals that in order to understand the dynamics 
between institutional ownership and information content, it is important to distinguish the 
institutional investors’ investment horizons. 
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Institutional Shareholding and Information Content of Dividend Surprises: 
Re-examining the Dynamics in the Dividend-Reappearance Era 
 
1. Introduction 
Institutional ownership has increased steadily in U.S. firms over the past three decades. Recently, 
institutional shareholders own more than 60% of the equity of U.S. firms, which was 
approximately 35% in 1980s (Schnatterly et al., 2008; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). Due to the 
increased presence of institutional shareholders, academicians and practitioners have paid 
considerable attention to how institutional investors affect corporate financial policies and firm 
value. For instance, in the context of payout literature, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) show that 
institutional shareholding is strongly associated with a firm’s dividend policy. Amihud and Li 
(2006) further show that institutional ownership can explain  the “disappearing dividend” 
phenomenon observed in the 1980-2000 period by linking institutional ownership to the 
declining information content of dividend payments. While subsequent studies confirm the 
importance of institutional shareholding in payout decisions (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston, 
2012), its relevance to information content of dividend announcements is apparently linked to the 
dividend-disappearance phenomenon (Amihud and Li, 2006).    
In an influential study, Fama and French (2001) document that the proportion of firms 
that pay cash dividends fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s. However, DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) show that while the number of dividend paying firms has fallen, 
the total amount of cash dividends by U.S. industrial firms has increased over time. Other studies 
have acknowledged the dividend-disappearance phenomenon, yet they report a reappearance of 
dividends since 2002 (Andres et al., 2009; Julio and Ikenberry, 2004; Chetty and Saez, 2005; 
Floyd, Li, and Skinner, 2013). In this study, we examine the role of institutional ownership in 
explaining the information content of dividend announcements during the dividend-reappearance 
era (i.e. in the post-2002 period). Specifically, we focus on the following research questions in 
the context of dividend reappearance: Is there a significant level of information content in 
dividend announcements? Does institutional ownership explain the level of information content 
(proxied by cumulative abnormal return [CAR]) associated with the dividend announcements? 
What aspects of institutional ownership explain the negative relationship between institutional 
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ownership and announcement-period CARs, if any? We examine these issues using a sample of 
dividend-paying NYSE firms over the period 2002-2012.1  
 The dividend literature has put forward a number of explanations in the context of 
institutional ownership and the information content of dividend announcements – which drive 
our empirical set-up. We organize these explanations under three arguments, which we discuss in 
detail in the next section. The “Dividend relevance argument,” which is based on signalling 
(Ross, 1977; Bhattacharya, 1979; Kalay, 1980), suggests that dividends are relevant for 
investors, and firms can convey important signals to the market through their dividend policy. 
The “Informational advantage and informed-trading argument” suggests that institutional 
investors – especially the short-investment horizon ones - have access to superior private 
information. They trade on this information prior to actual dividend announcements, which 
reduces the information content of dividend announcements (Amihud and Li, 2006). The 
“Dividend preference argument” suggests that among dividend-paying firms, dividend payments 
do not affect institutional clientele (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Andres et al., 2013) and are 
less likely to prefer dividend surprises. We use these arguments to explain our empirical results.  
At the outset, we would like to point out that the nature of dividend announcements and 
the perceptions of dividend surprise and heterogeneity among institutional investors pose some 
challenges in pursuing relevant empirical analyses. In this study, we address all these empirical 
challenges. In short, (i) we control for concurrent earnings announcements, because in 
approximately 90% of the cases, dividend announcements are made concurrently or within two 
days of the earnings announcement, (ii) we use analysts’ forecast consensus as a benchmark to 
calculate dividend surprise (Andres, Betzer, Haesner, Theissen, and van den Bongard, 2013), and 
(iii) we segregate the investment horizon of institutional investors (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 
2005; Yan and Zhang, 2009).  
Our multivariate results show that dividend surprise does not explain CAR, whereas 
earnings surprise shows a significant and positive effect. Our results imply that - consistent with 
the findings during the dividend-disappearance period - dividend change announcements do not 
show any significant information content in the dividend-reappearance period. Further, 
                                                          
1 We start the sample period from 2002, as recent literature shows that dividend-reappearance phenomenon started 
around 2002 (Julio and Ikenberry, 2004; Chetty and Saez, 2005; Andres et al., 2009). We document similar results 
in Figure 1 for industrial firms up to 2012.   
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consistent with Amihud and Li (2006), we find that institutional shareholding has a negative and 
significant effect on dividend announcement period CAR. The results may indicate that the 
presence of institutional investors reduces the information content of dividend announcements.  
Subsequently, we examine the plausible explanations for the negative relationship 
between institutional shareholding and announcement period CAR by examining institutional 
investors’ informed-trading activities and dividend preferences. Our results show that long-
horizon institutional shareholders do not prefer dividend surprises. We further find that within 
dividend paying firms, higher dividends do not attract institutional clientele. These results 
present some plausible explanation as to why the institutional investors are less enthusiastic 
about surprise dividend announcements, which in turn lead to lower CAR around the 
announcement dates. Unlike Amihud and Li’s (2006) prediction, we do not find any evidence 
that the presence of institutional shareholding leads to an increased level of informed trading in 
the pre-announcement period.  
 Overall, our results show no definitive indication that the dividend announcement is 
informative in the post-2002 dividend-reappearance period. Therefore, we do not find support for 
the “Dividend relevance argument”. Also, our results do not support the view that short-horizon 
institutional investors, who are considered better informed (Yan and Zhang, 2009), drive up the 
informed trading level prior to the dividend announcements. In other words, the “Informational 
advantage and information content argument” fails to explain the negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and announcement period CAR. Our results show support for the 
“Dividend preference argument”, which posits that institutional investors do not prefer dividend 
surprises and higher dividends do not attract institutional clientele.  
 Our study contributes to the dividend policy literature in the following ways. First, by 
examining the information content of dividend announcement in the dividend-reappearance era, 
this study contributes to the literature on dividend disappearance and reappearance debate (e.g., 
Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2004; Amihud and Li, 2006; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; von Eije and Megginson, 2008; 
Ferris, Sen, and Unlu, 2009; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009; Booth and Chang, 2013). Second, we 
contribute to the debate on whether short- and long-term institutional ownership has an 
informational advantage. The empirical evidence is inconclusive on whether short- and long-
term institutional ownership has an informational advantage. Several studies claim that short-
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term institutional investors are better informed (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Wermers, 2000; 
Yan and Zhang, 2009) and investors with informational advantage trade early on negative or 
positive news (Hotchkiss and Strickland, 2003; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Ke, Petroni, and Yu, 
2008). But Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) argue that long-term institutional investors, who 
specialize in monitoring and influencing firms’ policies, have better information and ability to 
gather and process information more efficiently. Moreover, a growing stream of studies show 
that ownership and trading by short-term investors are associated with mispricing, 
overconfidence, amplification of market-wide crisis, stock returns anomalies, higher 
idiosyncratic volatility, and myopic investment behavior (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Barber 
and Odean, 2000; Bushee, 2001; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2009; Cremers and Pareek, 2011; Cella, 
Ellul, and Giannetti, 2013). In the current study, we show that while the presence of long-horizon 
institutional investors reduces the probability of informed trading, the evidence for short-horizon 
institutional investors is not significant. Our study reveals that in order to understand the 
dynamics between institutional ownership and information content, it is important to distinguish 
institutional shareholders’ investment horizons in the empirical analyses. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present relevant literature and 
conjectures. Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results and 
Section 5 presents summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Relevant Literature and Conjectures 
We organize the following discussion under three arguments: (i) “Dividend Relevance 
Argument,” which focuses on dividend relevance and information content; (ii) “Informational 
Advantage and Informed Trading Argument,” which focuses on institutional investors’ 
informational advantage around dividend announcements and probability of informed trading; 
and (iii) “Dividend Preference Argument,” which focuses on the institutional investors’ 
preference for dividend payments.  
2.1 Dividend Relevance and Information Content (Dividend Relevance Argument) 
Over the past decade, significant debates in the academic literature have taken place over 
the disappearance, reappearance, and relevance of the dividend phenomenon. In an influential 
study, Fama and French (2001) document that the proportion of firms that pay cash dividends 
reduced significantly during the 1980s and 1990s. This finding implicitly questions the relevance 
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of dividend policy and use of dividends as a costly but effective means of signalling. Andres et 
al. (2009) discuss possible reasons for the disappearance of dividends that include substitution of 
dividend payments with share repurchases (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008), 
catering to the demand and requirements of investors (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a and 2004b), 
and a decline in the information content of dividend announcements (Amihud and Li, 2006).  
On the other hand, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) show that while the number 
of dividend-paying firms has been reduced, the total cash dividends paid by U.S. industrial firms 
have increased over time. Other studies have acknowledged the dividend-disappearance 
phenomenon, but they report a reappearance of dividends since 2002 (Andres et al., 2009; Julio 
and Ikenberry, 2004; Chetty and Saez, 2005). Julio and Ikenberry (2004), for instance, offer 
some plausible explanations for the reappearance of cash dividends. First, they find that the tax 
reform in 2003 (Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 2003), which reduces tax rate on 
dividends from 38.5% to 15%, is a major driving force behind the reappearance of dividends. 
Second, in the context of agency conflicts, Julio and Ikenberry find that firms with low leverage 
ratio (viewed as firms with lower governance quality due to lack of monitoring by debt-holders) 
pay higher dividends since early 2000s when large corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, Worldcom) 
eroded investors’ confidence.2 Finally, they argue that as more firms are making a transition 
from a growth to a mature phase, they require less cash for business expansion. Hence, more 
firms have started to pay dividends.  
In general, more recent studies find support for the reappearance of dividends since early 
2000s. These findings imply that dividends are still relevant for investors and firms can convey 
important signals to market through their dividend policy. A recent study by Karpavičius (2014) 
shows that dividend policy matters to a firm as it is related to firm value. Thus, given that 
dividend payments and change in dividend policy are costly for a firm, the information content 
revealed through dividends must be relevant and valuable (Andres et al., 2009; Balachandran et 
al., 2012). A positive dividend surprise is likely to signal a better prospect for the firm (Ross, 
1977; Kalay, 1980; Bhattacharya, 1979) or seen as a more disciplined approach in the context 
agency perspective (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Julio and Ikenberry, 2004). 
 
                                                          
2 Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that dividend payments lower agency conflicts in a firm by reducing 
free-cash flows that can be wasted by opportunistic managers. 
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2.2 Institutional Investor and Informational Advantage around Dividend Announcements 
(Informational Advantage and Informed Trading Argument) 
 Institutional investors own more than 60% of the equity of the U.S. firms (Schnatterly et 
al., 2008). This ownership level has increased significantly over the past two decades (Grinstein 
and Michaely, 2005). Prior studies show that institutional investors influence a firm’s corporate 
decisions, including its dividend policy (e.g., Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Attig et al., 2012; 
Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar, 2013). Therefore, it is likely that shareholding by institutional 
investors would affect the market reactions to dividend surprises around the announcement dates.  
Amihud and Li (2006) examine the relationship between institutional ownership and 
information content of dividend change announcement. Using a long time-series sample (1962–
1998), they find that information content of dividend announcements (proxied by CAR) for the 
U.S. firms has been decreasing over time and became almost zero by the end of year 2000. They 
attribute this phenomenon to the informed trading by institutional shareholders prior to public 
dividend announcements. Institutional investors are considered more sophisticated and better 
informed than retail investors (Puckett and Yan, 2011). “If institutional investors trade on their 
information about the firm’s value, then by the time that a dividend increase is announced, part 
of this information is already incorporated in the stock price and there is less additional 
information conveyed by the dividend increase announcement” (Amihud and Li, 2006, p. 638).  
Brockman and Yan (2009) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) argue that blockholders 
(that include institutional investors) have a clear advantage over diffuse shareholders in terms of 
access to private information. They can acquire firm-specific information at a lower cost. 
Consistent with this view, Brockman and Yan (2009) find that blockholders increase the 
probability of informed trading and idiosyncratic volatility. In the context of dividend policy, 
Amihud and Li (2006) present a similar view. As mentioned above, Amihud and Li (2006) argue 
that institutional shareholders have access to superior information and like to trade on this 
information prior to dividend announcements. Such informed trading by institutional investors 
prior to a surprise dividend announcement is likely to lower the information content of that 
event. This would present a plausible explanation for a negative relationship between 
shareholding by institutional investors and CAR around the surprise dividend announcements. 
 While presenting aforementioned arguments, we have made some implicit assumptions 
that all institutional investors are homogeneous and they have access to and exploit similar 
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private information. However, a number of earlier studies argue and empirically show that 
institutional investors are not homogeneous and they also play an important role of monitoring 
managers. One of the main dimensions that institutional investors differ across is their 
investment horizon (e.g., Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005; Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar, 
2013). For example, pension funds have a long-term investment horizon as they have long-term 
liabilities; whereas mutual funds are likely to have a short-term investment horizon, as they may 
face a large liquidation in the short-term (Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar, 2013). Differences in 
investment horizons, in turn, are likely to affect institutional investors’ governance role and 
trading strategies. Attig et al. (2013) posit that institutional investors with a short-term horizon 
have fewer incentives to engage in efficient monitoring because they tend to trade more 
frequently and may have weaker bargaining power. Recent studies find support for these 
arguments. For example, Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) find that short-horizon institutional 
investors pay less attention to monitoring of managers and generally have a weaker bargaining 
power. On the contrary, long-term investors assume a more active corporate governance role. 
This is likely to limit long-term investors from pursuing informed trading, which is viewed as an 
exploitation of private information at the expense of other investors. Yan and Zhang (2009) show 
that short-horizon investors are more efficient in acquiring and exploiting private information. 
However, Yan and Zhang (2009) do not find similar results for long-term institutions. The study 
concludes that short-horizon institutions are better informed and they trade actively to exploit 
their informational advantage. Accordingly, in the context of dividend surprise, we expect that 
due to a lack of focus on governance and a better informational advantage, short-horizon 
investors will be involved in more informed trading prior to the dividend announcement date.  
 
2.3 Institutional Investor and Preference for Dividend Payments (Dividend Preference 
Argument) 
Earlier studies examined and documented several important relations between 
institutional investors, their dividend preferences and a firm’s dividend policy. Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) summarize corporate finance theories that explain the interaction between 
institutional ownership and dividend payouts. First, institutional investors might exert more 
pressure on managers to pay higher dividends, which, in turn, would mitigate a firm’s free cash 
flow problem (Jensen 1986). A number of studies posit that dividends can serve as a constraint 
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on wasteful spending by firms with poor growth opportunities (Officer, 2011; Denis, 2011). 
Second, Allen et al. (2000) argue that firms may want to attract more institutional investors to 
benefit from their monitoring role and informational advantage. “Institutional investors prefer 
dividends because of common institutional charter and prudent-man rule restrictions and because 
of the comparative tax advantages that some institutions have for dividends” (pp. 1389-1390). 
Thus, firms may pay higher dividends to attract more institutional investors. These two factors 
imply a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and dividend payouts. However, 
based on Brennan and Thakor’s (1990) model, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) present a third 
reason, which predicts an opposite relationship by considering relative preferences for cash 
dividends and share repurchase by institutional investors vis-a-vis diffuse investors. This 
reasoning is based on an adverse selection problem, which suggests that diffuse or uninformed 
shareholders will be more inclined to receive cash dividends instead of participating in share 
repurchase. On the other hand, institutional investors, who are considered better informed, will 
prefer stock repurchase, as it is the least costly payout for them (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005) 
and facilitates a redistribution of wealth between informed (i.e., institutional) and uninformed 
(diffuse) shareholders. Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that in the U.S., share repurchase has 
become a predominant form of payouts since mid-1980s after the adoption of Rule 10b-18 by the 
SEC, which favors payouts through share repurchases. However, Grinstein and Michaely’s 
(2005) empirical findings do not show any definitive relation between institutional holding and 
dividend payouts that are consistent with exiting theories. They report that, “institutions prefer 
dividend-paying firms to non-dividend-paying firms, but within dividend-paying firms, 
institutions are not attracted to high dividends” (p. 1422). Gaspar et al (2012), who incorporated 
the institutional owners’ investment horizon in their analyses, report similar results. 
In terms of preference for dividend changes, Amihud and Li (2006) argue that 
institutional investors would have less inclination for a dividend change. There are two plausible 
reasons: first, because institutional investors are better informed, they will be less inclined to 
know about firm’s future prospect through dividend change signals. Thus, firms with high 
institutional holdings are less likely to use dividend changes to inform investors, given that 
dividends are costly means of signalling (Amihud and Li, 2006). Second, dividend surprises are 
likely to compel long-horizon institutional investors to rebalance their portfolios. This can be 
costly and conflicting with their trading strategies, such as indexation of a large portion of their 
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portfolios (Lewellen, 2011) or longer liability maturities. Amihud and Li (2006) find empirical 
support for these arguments that higher institutional holdings reduce the probability of dividend 
changes. Given the nature of investment objectives, the long-horizon institutional investors are 
likely to prefer less dividend surprises.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We consider the quarterly dividend announcements by NYSE-listed firms between 2002 and 
2012, which identifies a dividend-reappearance era (Julio and Ikenberry, 2004; Chetty and Saez, 
2005; Andres et al., 2009; Hauser, 2013; Floyd, Li, and Skinner, 2013). Figure 1 shows the 
percentage of dividend-paying (industrial) firms over the 1975-2012 period. According to this 
figure, there is a steady surge in the percentage of dividend-paying firm since 2002 until 2012, 
with a brief exception of 2008-2009 period. This steady incline in dividend payment is often 
referred as the “dividend re-appearance era” and prompted further investigation in this study.  
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
To be included in the sample, we require that: (i) dividends are cash dividends associated 
with ordinary common shares, (ii) relevant trading data are available in the TAQ database, and 
(iii) dividend and earnings announcements are made within two days of each other3. As dividend 
(earnings) surprise is a key variable in this study, analysts’ dividend (earnings) forecast data are 
used from I/B/E/S. Therefore, cases for which there is no analysts’ forecast data are deleted. 
Based on these criteria, we have an initial sample of 5,391 cases. Subsequently, in line with other 
recent studies (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2004; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006), we exclude financial and utility firms from the sample. 
Further, we delete the cases for which we do not have the long- and short-horizon institutional 
ownership data. This leads to a final sample size of 2,562 cases.  
 In addition to the I/B/E/S dataset, dividend, stock price, and trading data are used from 
CRSP. Intra-day data are obtained from TAQ and firm-specific data (size, sales, market 
                                                          
3 Examination of initial sample shows that 75% of the dividend and earnings announcements are made concurrently 
and another 17% announcements are made within two days of each other. Since the stand-alone announcements are 
a rarity and likely to have different information content dynamics, and we exclude such cases from the sample. 
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capitalization, etc.) are collected from COMPUSTAT. The CDA/Spectrum compiles relevant 
data from 13F SEC filings are used to obtain information on institutional ownership.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to test the relevant conjectures as presented in section 2, we carry out several 
multivariate analyses. In particular, we examine the impact of (i) dividend surprise and 
institutional shareholders’ investment horizons on cumulative abnormal returns, (ii) institutional 
shareholders’ investment horizons on informed trading, and (iii) institutional shareholders’ 
investment horizons on dividend surprises. Further, in order to examine whether the institutional 
investors’ prefer higher dividend paying firms, we investigates the relation between dividend 
payouts and level of institutional clientele. 
 
3.2.1 CAR, dividend surprise and institutional investor: To analyze the impact of dividend 
surprise and institutional shareholders’ investment horizons on cumulative abnormal returns we 
estimate several specifications of the following model (subscripts suppressed for notational 
convenience)4. Appendix-A presents the detail description of each variable. For all regression 
models we use OLS methodology and the test statistics are based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by firm. This will account for heteroskedasticity and the correlation across 
observations of the same firm over time.5  
 
CAR = β0  + β1×DIV_SUR  + β2×EAR_SUR  +β3×INST_INV +β4×Log_SIZE + β5×Log_AGE +β6×ATO 
+β7×Log_NUMANL +β8×ROA +β9×GROWTH +β10×DIVYLD +β11×DISP_DPS + β12×DISP_EPS  
+ β13×REPURCHASE  +  Industry dummy + Year dummy                                                  (1) 
 
                                                          
4 We thank the referee for suggesting us to control for the dispersion of analysts’ forecast and stock repurchase 
variable in the multivariate analyses. 
5 In the empirical analysis (equation 1, 2, 3 and 4), we primarily use a panel data structure. However, one of the key 
tables (Table 5) does not use a panel data set-up. Hence, for consistency, we report OLS regression results (robust 
regressions with firm level clustering) throughout the paper.  As a robustness check, we have repeated all analyses 
(except Table 5) using panel data regression models (random or fixed effect models). Main conclusions of our paper 




where, CAR, the cumulative abnormal return, is the measure of market reactions to dividend 
surprise. To compute CAR, we follow standard event study methodology to calculate abnormal 
returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcement dates (-1 to +1 
days). However, as we discussed earlier, in most instances dividend and earnings announcement 
are made concurrently and hence CAR might not denote just the market reactions to dividend 
changes.  We address this issue in the empirical analysis (reported in table 5).  
 
Key independent variables: DIV_SUR is the standardized difference between actual and 
expected dividend payments, used as a measure of dividend surprise. EAR_SUR is the 
standardized difference between actual and expected earnings per share, used as a measure of 
earnings surprise. INST_INV, aggregate institutional ownership, is defined as the ratio of the 
number of shares held by institutional investors relative to the total number of shares outstanding 
(Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Yan and Zhang, 2009). Subsequently, based on the average churn 
rate, we create other sub-categories of institutional investors in terms of investment horizon, 
namely, SHINST_INV (short-horizon institutional investor), LHINST_INV (long-horizon 
institutional investor) and NSHINST_INV (non-short-horizon institutional investor).  
 
Other Control Variables: In line with the prior studies, we control for a number of other 
variables in the multivariate analysis (Amihud and Li, 2006; Andres et al. 2013; Attig et al., 
2013): Log_SIZE, the natural logarithm of total asset in millions of dollars (to control for the 
size effect) lagged by one-year; GROWTH, growth in sales over the last two years (to control 
for future investment opportunity) lagged by one-year; ROA, the return on asset (to control for 
past profitability) lagged by one-year; ATO, the asset turnover ratio (to control for operating 
efficiency) lagged by one-year; Log_NUMANL, natural logarithm of the number of analysts 
providing dividend forecasts (to control for the degree of information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders); Log_AGE, natural logarithm of the firm’s age based on its listing 
information from CRSP (to control for the maturity of a firm); DIVYLD, firm’s dividend yield 
based on yearly dividend (to control for a firm’s past dividend payments); DISP_DPS, dispersion 
of analysts’ dividend forecast (to control for the heterogeneity in analysts’ dividend forecast); 
DISP_EPS, dispersion of analysts’ dividend forecast (to control for the heterogeneity in analysts’ 
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earnings forecast), REPURCHASE, dummy variable to denote whether the firm had a stock repurchase 
in the previous  year.  
 
3.2.2 Informed Trading and institutional investor: To analyze the impact of institutional 
shareholders’ investment horizons on cumulative abnormal returns we estimate several 
specifications of the following model.  Appendix-A presents the detail description of each 
variable. 
 
PIN = β0 +β1×DIV_SUR +β2×EAR_SUR +β3×INST_INV +β4×Log_SIZE +β5×Log_AGE +β6×ATO 
+β7×Log_NUMANL +β8×ROA +β9×GROWTH +β10×DIVYLD + β11×Log_VOL + β12×DISP_DPS 
+  β13×DISP_EPS +  β14×REPURCHASE  +  Industry dummy + Year dummy                         (2) 
 
where, PIN denotes the probability of informed trading (Easley, Hividkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002). 
We compute the PIN using trading data for -16 to -65 days relative to the announcement date. 
All other variables are similar to the ones included in equation 1. For all specifications of the 
equation 2, we use OLS methodology and the test statistics are based on robust standard error 
adjusted for clustering by firm. 
 
3.2.3 Institutional shareholders’ investment horizons, dividend surprises and 
preference for higher dividends: Earlier studies assert that institutional investors would have 
less inclination for a dividend change (Amihud and Li, 2006; Lewellen, 2011). We extend their 
argument to dividend surprise. As dividend surprise can be either positive or negative, we focus 
on absolute dividend surprise in our analysis to evaluate institutional investors’ preference for 
unexpected dividend changes. To analyze whether the presence institutional shareholders’ 
investment horizons have any significant impact on the dividend surprises, we estimate several 
specifications of the following model.   
 
ABS_DIV_SUR = β0 +β1×INST_INV +β2×Log_SIZE +β3×Log_AGE +β4×ATO +β5×Log_NUMANL 
+β6×ROA +β7×GROWTH +β8×DISP_DPS +β9×DIVYLD +β10×REPURCHASE  +  Industry 




where, ABS_DIV_SUR denotes the absolute value of DIV_SUR. All other variables are similar to 
the ones included in equation 1. For all specifications of the equation 3, we use OLS 
methodology and test statistics that are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering by 
firm. 
It is well established in the literature that dividends are sticky and if firms have to change 
dividend payments, generally they prefer to increase dividends. However, do higher dividends 
attract more institutional investors? Do institutional investors prefer to invest in higher dividend 
paying firms? Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that while institutional investors prefer to 
invest in dividend paying firms, higher dividends do not attract additional institutional 
investment. Using our sample, we pursue a similar inquiry. To investigate whether the level of 
dividend payments affect institutional shareholding, we estimate several specifications of the 
following model.6   
 
INST_INV = β0 + β1×PAYOUT + β2×Log_SIZE + β3×Log_AGE + β4×ATO + β5×ROA + β6×BETA + 
β7×GROWTH  +  Industry dummy + Year dummy                                                                (4) 
 
where, INST_INV denotes the aggregate institutional ownership, defined as the ratio of the 
number of shares held by institutional investors relative to the total number of shares 
outstanding. Based on their investment horizon, we use different categories of institutional 
ownership in the model specifications.  PAYOUT denotes dividend payout ratio of the firm. We 
measure dividend payout by scaling total dividends paid with total assets (Aivazian, Booth, and 
Cleary, 2003; Brockman and Unlu, 2009)7. Other variables are described in Appendix-A. For all 
                                                          
6 We did not include Log_NUMANL and REPURCHASE variables in the regression models for two reasons: (i) our 
results (not reported here) show that these variables do not have any significant effect on institutional ownership; (ii) 
they are used as valid instruments in the simultaneous equation modeling to address the endogeneity issue between 
INST_INV and PAYOUT.  
7 Few studies use other variables to measure the levels of a firm’s dividend payment, namely: dividend payout ratio 
(dividends/net income); dividend yield (dividends/share price); and dividend-to-book value of equity. However, as 
suggested by Brockman and Unlu (2009), and Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003), among others, we will focus 
mainly on the dividends-to-assets, dividend-to-sales ratios for the following reasons: Dividend payout ratios can be 
unstable and non-normal as earnings get close to zero; dividend yield incorporates market perceptions and pricing 
effects that are often beyond management control; and deflating dividend by the book value of equity could be more 
sensitive to accounting distortions (Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary, 2003). 
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specifications of the equation 4, we use OLS methodology and the test statistics are based on 
robust standard error adjusted for clustering by firm. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 (Panel A) presents the year-wise quarterly dividend announcement cases (2,562). Out of 
these, 476 are positive surprises, 236 are negative surprises and 1,850 cases show no surprises. 
Panel B presents the industry-wise quarterly dividend announcement cases. The two leading 
industries that experience higher quarterly dividend announcements are Manufacturing (22%) 
and Wholesale, Retail, and Services industry (15%).   
Table 1 (Panel C) presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the study. 
We find that on average there is 0.44% of cumulative abnormal return around the dividend 
announcement date (-1 to +1 day). Average dividend surprises and average earnings surprises are 
0.01% and 0.05%, respectively. These statistics indicate that earnings surprises are more 
pronounced in terms of magnitude; hence we consider both effects simultaneously in the 
multivariate analysis. On an average the firms experience a 14% sales growth over two years and 
show a profitability of approximately 7% per year (ROA). Most of the firms in our sample are 
quite mature, with an average firm age of 36; the average beta of these firms is 1.13, which is 
close to the overall market beta. We find that on an average 2.3 analysts follow a firm.  
 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
The descriptive statistics of the institutional investors reveal some important information. 
On average, 80% of firms’ shares are held by institutional investors. This shows that in any 
corporate policy analysis, it is important to consider the effect of institutional ownership. Further, 
long-horizon and short-horizon institutional investors hold approximately 17% and 33% shares, 
respectively. In other words, approximately 47% shares (i.e. 80% aggregate institutional 
ownership - 33% short-horizon institutional ownership) are held by non-short-horizon 
institutional investors. This is an important statistic to consider, as it shows that overall influence 
of institutional investors on dividend policy and information content of dividend policy is likely 
to be governed by the non-short-horizon institutional investors.  
 Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients of important variables. Interestingly, we see 
that short-horizon and long-horizon institutional shareholding has opposite and significant 
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correlation with CAR, PIN and PAYOUT variables. These univariate results show the 
differential effects of institutional investors with diverse investment horizons. We also find that 
EAR_SUR (earnings surprise) show a significant positive correlation with CAR, while 
DIV_SUR (dividend surprise) does not show any significant correlation. This result gives some 
preliminary indication that dividend surprises are less informative. However, one needs to 
interpret the univariate results with caution, as they ignore any confounding effects (Golupov et 
al. 2012). For example, the correlation matrix shows a significant and negative correlation 
coefficient between INST_INV and PAYOUT. This could be misleading as the literature shows 
that while institutional investors could affect dividend payout, the opposite is not true. The 
univariate result does not shed light on such causal relationship. Therefore, relevant control 
variables should be incorporated in the multivariate analysis to obtain more robust results.  
 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Market reactions to dividend announcements 
 This section examines the market reactions to dividend announcements using the event 
study methodology. Consistent with Amihud and Li’s (2006) approach, we use announcement 
period CAR as a measure of information content. Table 3 presents the univariate test results for 
CAR for different event windows. Our results show that in each event window, the CAR is 
positive and significant. Apparently, this result implies that dividend announcements contain a 
significant level of new information. However, as mentioned in the earlier section, our sample 
consists of concurrent dividend and earnings announcements. Unless the information content of 
earnings announcements is controlled, any conclusion on the information content of dividend 
will be misleading. 
 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
 Subsequently, the multivariate analyses examine the effect of dividend surprises and 
earnings surprises simultaneously. In addition, using the same multivariate framework, we 
examine the effect of institutional investors in the presence of set of control variables. We use 
equation 1 to carry out relevant analyses and use CAR (-1 to +1) as a measure of information 
content associated with dividend announcements.  
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Table 4 presents the results of Model 1 which shows the effects of DIV_SUR (i.e., 
dividend surprise) in the presence of other control variables; Model 2 adds the effect of 
EAR_SUR (i.e., earnings surprise); and Model 3 includes the effect of INST_INV (i.e., 
institutional investors). In all three models, we find that the coefficient of DIV_SUR is not 
significant. It implies that dividend surprises do not reveal any significant information. This 
result is consistent with Amihud and Li’s (2006) finding that there has been a declining trend in 
information content of dividend announcements since the 1980s, and by the year 2000, it has 
become almost insignificant. While Amihud and Li’s (2006) findings corroborate the dividend-
disappearance phenomenon, our results show that the lack of information content of divided 
announcements persists even in the dividend-reappearance era. Thus, these results do not support 
the prediction of “Divided relevance argument”.  
 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Models 2 and 3 (Table 4) show that an earnings surprise (EAR_SUR) has a positive and 
significant effect on the CAR. It implies that markets are eager to know about better-than-
expected earnings of the firm. Taken together, the results for DIV_SUR and EAR_SUR variables 
reveal an important aspect of the information content associated with dividend and earnings 
announcements. Model 3 includes the effect of institutional investors. We find that Institutional 
Investor (INST_INV) variable does not have any significant effect on CAR. However, 
interpretation of this result could be complicated, as in most instances CAR incorporate both 
dividend and earnings surprise components. In order to circumvent this problem we create a sub-
sample in which we keep the cases with dividend surprises but restrict the earnings surprise to 10 
percentile level8. Although, this approach reduces the sample size, it enables us to obtain CAR 
values that are driven primarily by dividend surprises. Table 5 presents the relevant results.  
 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Model 1 includes the effect of INST_INV. Model 2 examines the effect of investment 
horizon by including SHINST_INV (short-horizon institutional investor) and LHINST_INV 
(long-horizon institutional investor) variables. Model 3 investigates the effect of NSHINST_INV 
(non-short-horizon institutional investor). Consistent with Amihud and Li (2006), in Model 1 we 
                                                          
8 We obtain similar results, once we restrict earnings surprise level to 5 percentile or 15 percentile.  
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find that INST_INV has a significant and negative effect on CAR. It implies that the presence of 
institutional investors (INST_INV) reduces the information content of dividend announcements.  
Amihud and Li (2006) argue that institutional investors have access to sophisticated private 
information and they are likely to trade on their information about the firm’s value prior to the 
actual announcement date. Next, we examine the effect of investment horizon on dividend 
surprises’ information content (Model 2 and 3). Model 2 does not show any significant effect of 
either SHINST_INV or LHINST_INV. Whereas Model 3 reveals that aggregate level non-short-
horizon institutional investors have a negative and significant effect on CAR. Overall, our results 
show that the presence of institutional investors and particularly the non-short-horizon 
institutional investors reduce the information content of dividend surprises.  
 
4.2. Institutional Investor, Informational Advantage, and Informed Trading 
 The negative relationship between institutional investors and CAR, as presented in Table 
5, implies that the presence of institutional investors reduces the information content of dividend 
surprises. Amihud and Li (2006) suggest that this could be due to informed trading by 
institutional investors that takes place before the official dividend announcements. Is this 
prediction empirically supported? Which type of institutional investor (short-horizon, long-
horizon or aggregate level non-short-horizon) pursues informed trading? We examine these 
questions in this section. We use variations of equation 2 to examine the influence of different 
factors, including that of institutional investors, on the probability of informed trading prior to 
the dividend announcement dates. Consistent with the extant literature, PIN (Easley, Hividkjaer, 
and O’Hara, 2002) is used as a measure of informed trading.  
Model 1 (table 6) considers the effect of the aggregate level of institutional ownership on 
the pre-announcement period informed trading. Model 2 and 3 includes the effect of short- and 
long-horizon institutional investors, while Model 4 considers the effect of non-short-horizon 
institutional investors. Further, Model 3 and 4 include some additional control variables such as, 
dividend surprise (DIV_SUR), earnings surprise (EAR_SUR) and stock repurchase dummy 
(REPURCHASE). We find that the aggregate level institutional investor (INST_INV) does not 
affect the probability of informed trading (Model 1), while the presence of long-horizon 
institutional investors (LHINST_INV) reduces informed trading (Model 2). However the effect 
of LHINST_INV becomes insignificant once we include more controls (Model 3). Model 4 
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further shows that the non-short-horizon institutional investors (NSHINST_INV) have a negative 
and significant effect on PIN (p-value of 0.062).  
 
Insert Table 6 About Here 
Overall, our results show that there is no significant evidence of institutional investors 
increasing the level of informed trading prior to the surprise dividend announcements. Rather, 
we find evidence that non-short-term institutional investors reduce the level of informed trading. 
These findings are in line with Yan and Zhang’s (2009) argument that long-horizon institutional 
investors are not better informed and they do not trade actively to exploit their informational 
advantage. In addition, our results do not support the view that the short-horizon institutional 
investors, who are considered better informed, drive up the informed trading level prior to the 
dividend announcements. 
 
4.3 Institutional shareholders’ investment horizons, dividend surprises and preference for 
higher dividends 
As the informed-trading argument does not adequately explain the negative relationship 
between the presence of institutional investors and CAR, we further explore the relationship in 
the context of institutional investors’ divided preference. We do so by adopting two approaches. 
We examine: (i) the impact of the presence of institutional investors on dividend surprises 
(equation 3), and (ii) whether the dividend payout level helps in attracting more institutional 
ownership (equation 4). 
 
4.3.1 Institutional investor and dividend surprises: Table 7 presents the results of 
regression models (based on equation 3) that examine the effect of aggregate level institutional 
ownership (INST_INV) on absolute dividend surprises (ABS_DIV_SUR). Model 1, 2 and 3 
differ in terms of control variables. Results from Model 1 and 2 suggest that the INST_INV 
variable has a significant and negative impact on ABS_DIV_SUR. These findings are consistent 
with Amihud and Li’s (2006) argument that institutional owners do not like dividend changes. 
However, once we control for REPURCHASE variable in the regression (Model 3), the 
significance of INST_INV coefficient disappears. Therefore, although we see a negative relation 
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between INST_INV and ABS_DIV_SUR, the results are not robust. Subsequently we focus on 
the different categories of institutional investors based on their investment horizons. 
 
Insert Table 7 About Here 
Insert Table 8 About Here 
Table 8 presents the results of regression models (based on equation 3) that examine the 
effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon on absolute dividend surprises 
(ABS_DIV_SUR). Model 1, 2 and 3 include the effect of SHINST_INV (short-horizon 
institutional investor) and LHINST_INV (long-horizon institutional investor) variables. Model 4 
investigates the effect of NSHINST_INV (non-short-horizon institutional investor). Results from 
Model 1, 2, and 3 consistently document that the presence of long-horizon institutional investor 
(LHINST_INV) reduces dividend surprises. In other words, long-horizon institutional investors 
do not prefer unexpected dividend changes. Model 4 reports similar result for NSHINST_INV 
(non-short-horizon institutional investor). These findings are in line with Amihud and Li’s 
(2006) argument that institutional investors have a lower preference for dividend changes. As 
institutional investors are relatively better informed, firms do not need to use dividend changes 
as a signal for its future to inform institutional investors. Similar arguments are put forward by 
Andres et al. (2013). They posit that large institutional investors - especially long-horizon 
institutional investors - have strong incentives to monitor managers, which would alleviate 
agency conflict. Therefore, firms do not need to use dividends as a signal for reduced agency 
conflict. Further, dividend surprises are likely to compel long-horizon institutional investors to 
rebalance their portfolios, which can be costly and may require reformulating their trading 
strategies. Overall our results show that institutional investors, especially the long- or non-short-
horizon institutional investors are not enthusiastic about dividend surprises and hence are likely 
to react negatively to such announcements.  
 
4.3.2 Dividend payout and institutional investors: Table 9 presents the results of 
regression models (based on equation 4) that examine whether higher dividend payouts attract 
more institutional investors within the dividend paying firms. We use institutional investment as 
the dependent variable and dividend payout ratio (PAYOUT) as the primary independent 
variable in the regression models. Model 1, 2 and 3 include INST_INVT (aggregate level 
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institutional investor), SHINST_INV (short-horizon institutional investor) and LHINST_INV 
(long-horizon institutional investor) as dependent variables respectively. Model 1 and 2 results 
show that higher dividend payouts are associated with lower aggregate and short-horizon 
institutional investments respectively. Model 3 results indicate that dividend payout does not 
affect the level of long-horizon institutional ownership (Model 3). These results show that higher 
level of dividend payout would not attract more institutional investment. Rather, within dividend 
paying firms, institutional investors (especially short-horizon ones) prefer the firms with lower 
dividend payments.  It implies that institutional investors will unlikely to be happy about positive 
dividend surprises that increase a firm’s dividend payout level in the subsequent periods.  
 
Insert Table 9 About Here 
Although these results are interesting and support the notion that institutional investors do 
not get attracted to higher dividend paying firms, they are not consistent with results reported by 
existing literature which generally reports a non-significant result. For example, Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) and Gaspar et al. (2012) show that higher dividend payout does not attract more 
institutional ownership. One of the possibilities for obtaining a different result is the non-
consideration of the endogeneity issue in the regression analysis. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
posit that institutional ownership and dividend payouts could be endogeneously determined. In 
other words, a reverse causality could exist between institutional investors and dividend payouts.  
We use an instrumental-variable approach to address the endogeneity issue. We use 
REPURCHASE and Log_NUMANL as the instruments for PAYOUT variable. Extant literature 
shows that (e.g. Grullon and Michaely, 2002) stock repurchases could be used as a substitute for 
cash dividend. Other studies argue that financial analysts act as external monitors of the firm and 
can affect the dividend policy. Andres et al. (2013) show that the presence of financial analysts 
can lower information asymmetry between a firm and its investors, which in turn can affect a 
firm’s dividend policy (Li and Zhao, 2008). Nevertheless, we test for the validity of these 
instruments in the subsequent analysis.9 
  
                                                          
9 To be valid instruments, these two variables should not have any direct impact on institutional ownership variables. 
In order to test it, we regress institutional ownership variables on REPURCHASE and Log_NUMANL and find that 
these two variables do not show any significant impact (results are not reported here). 
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Insert Table 10 About Here 
Table 10 (Panel A) and Table 10 (Panel B) present the instrumental-variable regression 
results using 2SLS and GMM techniques respectively. There are two main assumptions with the 
instrumental variable approach: (i) the instruments are not weak, that is, they are sufficiently 
correlated with endogeneous regressors, and (ii) the excluded instruments are not correlated with 
the error terms. To address the first issue, we examine the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
We find that the F-statistic is significant at 5% level, which indicates the instruments are not 
weak. For the second assumption, we rely on Hansen-J statistic. We find that this statistic is not 
significant, which implies that the instruments are appropriately uncorrelated with the 
disturbance process (Baum, 2006). After ensuring the validity of the instruments, we turn our 
focus on the regression results. Table 10 (both Panel A and B) results show that PAYOUT 
variable does not have any significant impact on any of the institutional ownership variables 
(INST_INV, SHINST_INV, LHINST_INV). These results are consistent with Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) and Gaspar et al.’s (2012) findings, which indicates that level of dividend 
payouts is not instrumental in attracting more institutional ownership. This also implies that 
institutional investors will not be enthusiastic about any significant and unexpected dividend 
changes.  
 
4.4 Other Robustness Tests 
 To ensure robust result, first, we rerun all regression models that include DIV_SUR 
variable with a modified measure. Instead of mean forecast value, median forecast value is used 
as a benchmark to calculate DIV_SUR and the results are qualitatively similar. In case of SIZE, 
sales and market value of equity is used as alternative measures; for PAYOUT measures, 
“market value of equity” and “sales” as denominators are used for robustness; the results are 
unchanged with these new measures. Second, we use an alternative measure for informed trading 
- Huang and Stoll’s (1996) adverse selection component of the spread, to examine the 
institutional investors’ effect on informed trading. Our results are identical with this new 
measure of informed trading (the results are not reported here). Finally, we use different 





Using a sample of NYSE-listed dividend-paying firms over the period 2002-2012, we examine 
the significance of information content associated with dividend announcements in the dividend-
reappearance era and how institutional investors’ ownership and investment horizons affect the 
information content. We build on extant literature and put forward three arguments to understand 
and analyze our empirical findings: The “dividend relevance argument,” the “informational 
advantage and informed trading argument,” and the “dividend preference argument.”  
First, we find that in the dividend-reappearance era (2002-2008), dividend 
announcements are not associated with any significant level of market reactions (proxied by 
CAR). Thus our findings show no support for “dividend relevance argument”. We then examine 
the role of institutional investors in the disappearance of information content of dividend 
announcements with a sample that is dominated by dividend surprises and contain minimal or no 
earnings surprises. We look at the association between institutional investors and information 
content of dividend announcement (proxied by CAR) and find a significant and negative 
relationship. This implies that the presence of institutional investors dampens the information 
content of dividend announcements. In order to find a plausible explanation for this finding, 
following Amihud and Li’s (2006) argument, we examine the extent of informed trading by 
institutional investor in the pre-announcement period.  Our results indicate that informed trading 
is not related to the presence of short-term horizon institutional investors but is negatively related 
to non-short-horizon investors. These findings do not explain the negative relationship between 
institutional investors and market reactions to dividend announcements (measured by CAR) and 
hence question the validity of “informational advantage and informed trading argument”. 
Subsequently, we investigate institutional investors’ dividend preference and the analyses show 
that institutional investors (especially the long-horizon institutional investors) react to the 
unexpected dividend-change announcements negatively and the level of dividend payout is not 
instrumental in attracting institutional ownership. This evidence supports the “dividend 
preference argument,” and presents a plausible explanation as to why institutional ownership is 
associated with lower information content of dividend announcements (i.e. lower CAR around 
dividend announcements). Our study also stresses the importance of distinguishing the 
institutional investors’ investment horizon in the empirical analyses. 
One of the complementary arguments could be that within our sample informed trading 
level before the announcement period is low and, therefore, informed trading does not explain 
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the variation in CAR. Because our sample starts from 2002, which marks the introduction of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it remains a possibility. As Brochet (2010) explains, the introduction of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 has affected the overall informed trading activity by insiders.10 As 
SOX was implemented at the backdrop of mega-corporate scandals in early 2000, Brochet 
(2010) argues that following the adoption of SOX, insiders will be less prone to opportunistic 
trading because of increased monitoring by regulators and media. Accordingly, the study finds 
that private information induced insider trading decreases in the post SOX period (i.e., after 
2002). Similarly, Li and Zhang (2007) find that opportunistic insider selling ahead of accounting 
restatement announcements decreases in the post-SOX period. Whereas, Brockman, Tresl, Unlu 
(2014) report that stronger insider trading laws lead to a lower propensity of paying dividends, 
and smaller dividend amounts. These observations present some plausible explanations as to why 
informational advantage and informed trading argument does not explain the negative 













                                                          
10 “The SEC regulates insider trading in the U.S. Directors, officers, and principal stockholders (with a stake of 10 % 
or more) have to report most changes in their beneficial ownership to the SEC. Until August 2002, the reporting 
requirements were defined under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and consisted of filing a Form 4 
with the SEC within 10 days of the close of the calendar month of the transaction. Section 403 of SOX amends this 
provision as of August 29, 2002, by requiring insiders to file their Form 4 with the SEC within two business days of 
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We follow standard event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns (ARs) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcement dates (e.g. -1 to +1 days). The 
daily abnormal returns are computed using the market model: 
  )Rβα(RAR mtjjjtjt               
where Rjt  and Rmt are the observed returns for security ‘j’ and the market portfolio (S&P 
500 index) ‘m’, respectively, in time period ‘t’ relative to the event date of interest. The 
security-specific parameters  j  and j   are computed over the estimation period t-31 to 
t-120 trading days. We exclude the 30-day time interval t-30 to t-1 days to avoid including 







The difference between actual and expected dividend payments is used as a measure of 
dividend surprise. The arithmetic mean (the median is used as a robustness test) of 
analysts’ forecasts is used as a proxy for the market’s expectations of dividend payments. 
Finally, the forecast error (actual – expected dividend) is standardized by the share price 
five days prior to the dividend announcements date. 
   




The difference between actual and expected earnings per share is used as a measure of 
earnings surprise. The arithmetic mean (the median is used as a robustness test) of 
analysts’ forecasts is used as a proxy for the market’s expectations of earnings per share. 
Finally, the forecast error (actual – expected earnings per share) is standardized by the 
share price five days prior to the dividend announcements date. 
 














Where “α” is the probability of an information event, “µ” represents the order arrival of 
informed traders, and “ɛ” corresponds to the order arrival of uninformed traders. This 
probability measure is derived from a trading model that represents informed and 
uniformed order arrivals as a combined Poisson process (Easley, Hividkjaer, and O’Hara, 
2002). We compute the PIN using trading data for -16 to -65 days relative to the 




Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Yan and Zhang (2009), aggregate 
institutional ownership is defined as the ratio of the number of shares held by institutional 
investors relative to the total number of shares outstanding. Institutional investors are then 
categorised into short- and long-term investors on the basis of how frequently they rotate 
their positions on all the stocks of their portfolio over the previous four quarters. If we 
denote the set of companies held by investor j by Q, then we define the aggregate buy-
and-sell for each investor as follows: 
31 
 
𝐶𝑅_𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑗,𝑡 =  ∑ |𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1∆𝑃𝑖,𝑡|
𝑖∈𝑄,𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡>𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1
 
𝐶𝑅_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗,𝑡 =  ∑ |𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1∆𝑃𝑖,𝑡|
𝑖∈𝑄,𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡≤𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1
 
   
where CR_buyj,t is investor j’s aggregate purchase for quarter t, CR_sellj,t is investor j’s 
aggregate sale for quarter t, Nj,i,t is the number of shares of stock i held by investor j at the 
end of quarter t, and Pi,t is the share prices for stock i at the end of quarter t. We also adjust 
for stock splits and stock dividends by using the CRSP price adjustment factor. 
Following the definition from Yan and Zhang (2009), we calculate investor j’s 
churn rate as a measure of frequency in overall portfolio rotation, for quarter t as follows:  
𝐶𝑅𝑗,𝑡 =  
min (𝐶𝑅_𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑗,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑅_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗,𝑡)
∑
𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
2𝑖∈𝑄
 
                            
To minimize the impact of investor cash flows on portfolio turnover, the minimum of 
aggregate purchase and sale are used and for each institution’s average churn rate over the 








                        
Based on the average churn rate, all institutional investors are ranked in three tertile 
portfolios for each quarter. The top tertile with the highest AVG_CRj,t is defined as short-
horizon institutional investors and those in the bottom tertile as long-horizon institutional 
investors. For each stock, the short-horizon (long-horizon) institutional ownership 
SHINST_INV (LHINST_INV) is defined as the ratio between the number of shares held 





Other Control Variables 
Dispersion of analysts’ 
dividend forecast 
(DISP_DPS) 
It is the standard deviation of analysts’ dividend forecast.  
Dispersion of analysts’ 
earnings forecast 
(DISP_EPS) 
It is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast.  
Dividend yield 
(DIVYLD) 
Measured as the total cash dividend by the previous year-end share price.  
Dividend payout 
(PAYOUT) 
It denotes dividend payout ratio of the firm. We measure dividend payout by scaling total 
cash dividends paid with total assets (Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary, 2003; Brockman and 
Unlu, 2009). 
 
Firm size (SIZE) It denotes the total asset of the firm in million dollars. 
 




Measured as the growth in sales over the last two years. 
Return on asset (ROA) Measured as the net income divided by total asset of the firm. 
 




Volume (VOL) Average daily trading volume in the preceding quarter. 
 
Number of analysts 
(NUMANL) 
It denotes the number of analysts that follow a particular firm and make dividend/earnings 
forecasts. We use the natural logarithm of NUMANL (Log NUMANL) in the regression 
models. 
 






It is a dummy variable. REPURCHASE = 1, if the firm made stock repurchase in the year. 
We use a lag value of this variable. We follow Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013) while 





























Figure 1: Percentage of Dividend-Paying (Industrial) Firms over the 1975-2012 Period 
 























































































































































































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. 
 
Panel A. Year-wise dividend announcement distribution 




surprise No surprise 
2002 43 12 5 26 
2003 175 29 15 131 
2004 251 43 21 187 
2005 222 37 15 170 
2006 262 52 19 191 
2007 309 49 31 229 
2008 262 47 21 194 
2009 260 37 29 194 
2010 293 54 26 213 
2011 312 80 36 196 
2012 173 36 18 119 
Total 2,562 476 236 1,850 
 




Consume non-durables 249 9.72 
Consume durables 130 5.07 
Manufacturing 573 22.37 
Energy 205 8 
Chemicals & Allied Products 175 6.83 
Business equipment 234 9.13 
Telecommunications 111 4.33 
Wholesale, Retail, & Some Services 379 14.79 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, & Drugs 157 6.13 
Other 349 13.62 










Panel C. Mean, median and standard deviation of the variables used in the study 
Variable Brief Description Number Mean p25 Median p75 
Standard 
Deviation 
        CAR (-1, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Return 2562 0.0044 -0.0291 0.0027 0.0378 0.0568 
PAYOUT Payout ratio (dividend/total asset) 2557 0.0260 0.0106 0.0180 0.0317 0.0313 
PIN Probability of informed trading 2562 0.0905 0.0690 0.0870 0.1070 0.0354 
DIV_SUR Dividend surprise 2562 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
EAR_SUR Earnings surprise 2562 0.0005 0.0000 0.0004 0.0015 0.0035 
INST_INV Institutional Investor 2562 0.7957 0.6978 0.8010 0.8941 0.1585 
SHINST_INV Long-horizon Inst. Investor 2562 0.3358 0.2431 0.3259 0.4238 0.1221 
LHINST_INV Short-horizon Inst. Investor 2562 0.1739 0.1245 0.1628 0.2123 0.0679 
GROWTH Sales growth over 2-years 2544 0.1442 -0.0251 0.1146 0.2547 0.2896 
SIZE (MV of Equity) Market value of equity in million $ 2562 17900 1880 4635 16700 37700 
SIZE (Total Asset) Total asset in million $ 2562 18800 1698 4057 13200 44900 
AGE Firm age in years 2562 36.1756 17.0000 34.0000 46.0000 22.7768 
ATO Asset turnover ratio (Sales/total asset) 2562 1.1368 0.6915 0.9964 1.4338 0.6628 
NUMANL Number of analyst following the firm 2562 2.2959 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 1.6943 
VOL Average daily trading volume 2562 5690000 804000 2200000 5990000 10500000 
DISP_DIV Dispersion of analysts' dividend forecast 2528 0.0251 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0710 
DISP_EPS Dispersion of analysts' earnings forecast 2555 0.0603 0.0217 0.0407 0.0833 0.1747 
ROA Return on asset (net income/total asset) 2562 0.0694 0.0365 0.0657 0.1061 0.0755 
DIVYLD Dividend yield 2557 0.0209 0.0098 0.0172 0.0268 0.0158 
BETA Firm beta 2562 1.1387 0.8065 1.1132 1.4133 0.4857 











Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients between the main variables used in the study. p-values are presented in the parentheses.  
  
CAR (-1, 
+1) PAYOUT PIN INST_INV SHINST_INV LHINST_INV DIV_SUR EAR_SUR 
Log 
NUMANL REPURCHASE 
           CAR (-1, +1) 1 
                               
PAYOUT -0.0136 1 
          (0.491)                   
PIN 0.036 -0.134 1 
         (0.068) (000)                 
INST_INV -0.0181 -0.1682 0.1188 1 
        (0.360) (000) (000)               
SHINST_INV 0.0341 -0.2205 0.0388 0.6728 1 
       (0.084) (000) (0.049) (000)             
LHINST_INV -0.0573 0.1053 -0.0589 0.1953 -0.172 1 
      (0.004) (000) 0.0029 (000) (000)           
DIV_SUR -0.0026 0.0374 -0.0167 -0.0337 -0.0238 0.0186 1 
     (0.893) (0.059) (0.398) (0.088) (0.228) (0.346)         
EAR_SUR 0.2978 0.0141 -0.0272 -0.0792 -0.0346 -0.0066 0.0016 1 
    (000) (0.477) (0.169) (0.000) (0.080) (0.739) (0.936)       
Log NUMANL -0.0195 0.1254 -0.2448 -0.0881 -0.0582 0.119 -0.0058 -0.0224 1 
   (0.323) (000) (000) (000) (0.003) (000) (0.769) (0.256)     
REPURCHASE 0.02 0.1547 -0.0795 -0.0533 0.0065 -0.0385 0.0435 0.0065 -0.0297 1 









Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal returns (CAR) Around the Announcement Dates 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for various event windows around the dividend 
announcement dates. We follow standard event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns (ARs) 
and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcement dates. We use the market model, which 
expresses daily abnormal returns as )Rβα(RAR mtjjjtjt  . We compute the security-specific 
parameters   j  and j   over the estimation period t-31 to t-120 trading days. For each CAR value, a 
corresponding Z-statistic is presented in the adjacent column. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance 




CAR Period CAR Value Z-stat p-value 
CAR (-2, +2) 0.50%*** 6.903 <.001 
CAR (-1, +1) 0.44%*** 7.127 <.001 























Table 4: Effect of Dividend Surprises and Institutional Investors on Information Content 
of Dividend Announcements  
Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions that show the impact of dividend surprise, earnings 
surprise and institutional investor on information content of dividend announcements. We use CAR (-1, 
+1) as a measure of information content of dividend announcements. Model 1 includes the impact of 
dividend surprise (DIV_SUR), Model 2 adds the impact of earnings surprise (EAR_SUR), Model 3 adds 
the impact of institutional investor (INST_INV). All variable descriptions are presented in Appendix-A. 
All regression models include Fama-French industry dummies and year dummies. Test statistics are 
based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering by firm.  Standard errors are presented in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
DIV_SUR 1.2852 0.8712 0.8997 
 









   
(0.010) 
GROWTH 0.0016 0.0005 0.0003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log_SIZE 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0011 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log_AGE -0.0043** -0.0028 -0.0029 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ATO -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0029 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log_NUMANL 0.0013 0.0021 0.0022 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DISP_DPS -0.0203 -0.0168 -0.0174 
 






ROA 0.0086 0.0062 0.0049 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
DIVYLD -0.1958** -0.2232** -0.2253** 
 
(0.085) (0.088) (0.088) 
REPURCHASE 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.0209** 0.0220* 0.0283* 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) 
    Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 2,412 2,406 2,406 
Number of firms 307 307 307 
R-squared 0.018 0.108 0.108 







Table 5: Institutional Investors and Information Content of Dividend Announcements: 
Cased with dividend surprises only 
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions (using a subsample of high dividend surprise and low 
earnings surprise) that show the impact of dividend surprise, earnings surprise and institutional investor 
on information content of dividend announcements. We use CAR (-1, +1) as a measure of information 
content of dividend announcements. Model 1 includes the impact of aggregate level institutional investors 
(INST_INV), Model 2 includes the impact of short- (SHINST_INV) and long-horizon institutional 
investors (LHINST_INV), Model 3 includes the impact of non-short horizon institutional investor 
(NSHINST_INV). All variable descriptions are presented in Appendix-A. All regression models include 
Fama-French industry dummies and year dummies. Test statistics are based on robust standard error 
adjusted for clustering by firm.  Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 




(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 



















   
(0.064) 
DIV_SUR 0.4778 -0.8352 1.1662 
 
(7.058) (6.955) (7.176) 
DISP_DPS -0.1394** -0.1138 -0.1211** 
 
(0.064) (0.071) (0.060) 
DISP_EPS 0.0273 0.0303 0.0298 
 
(0.068) (0.078) (0.074) 
GROWTH 0.0080 0.0058 -0.0060 
 
(0.032) (0.035) (0.034) 
Log_SIZE -0.0041 0.0035 -0.0023 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Log_AGE -0.0018 0.0014 0.0042 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
ATO 0.0129 0.0083 0.0066 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Log_NUMANL 0.0217** 0.0175 0.0196** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
ROA -0.1936 -0.0673 -0.1343 
 
(0.141) (0.154) (0.125) 
DIVYLD -0.3220 -0.2742 -0.0020 
 
(0.649) (0.674) (0.713) 
REPURCHASE 0.0066 0.0112 0.0026 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant 0.0767 -0.0772 0.0320 
 
(0.097) (0.113) (0.083) 
    Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 101 101 101 
Number of firms 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.352 0.330 0.388 
Adj. R-squared 0.061 0.014 0.114 
40 
 
Table 6. Effect of Institutional Ownership on the Probability of Informed Trading 
Table 6 presents the results of OLS regressions using the full sample that show the impact of dividend 
surprise, earnings surprise and institutional investor on the probability of informed trading. We use PIN 
(Easley, Hividkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002) as a measure of informed trading during -16 to -65 day period 
preceding the dividend announcement dates. Model 1 includes the effect of aggregate level institutional 
ownership (INST_INV). Model 2 and 3 both include the effects of long-horizon institutional investor 
(LHINST_INV) and short-horizon institutional investor (SHINST_INV). Model 4 further examines the 
effect of non-short horizon institutional investors (NSHINST_INV). All variable descriptions are 
presented in Appendix-A. All regression models include Fama-French industry dummies and year 
dummies. Test statistics are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering by firm.  
Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     INST_INV -0.0076 
   
 
(0.005) 













   
-0.0116* 










   
(0.162) (0.165) 
Log_SIZE -0.0048*** -0.0045*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log_AGE -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0011 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ATO -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log_VOL -0.0063*** -0.0063*** -0.0062*** -0.0064*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log_NUMANL -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISP_DPS 0.0039 0.0039 0.0031 0.0019 
 




   
(0.003) (0.003) 
ROA -0.0575*** -0.0522*** -0.0505*** -0.0521*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
GROWTH 0.0041* 0.0039* 0.0035 0.0032 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 








   
(0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.2291*** 0.2270*** 0.2191*** 0.2218*** 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
     Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 2,507 2,507 2,406 2,406 
Number of firms 316 316 307 307 
R-squared 0.327 0.328 0.322 0.322 


























Table 7. Influence of Institutional Ownership on Absolute Dividend Surprise 
Table 7 presents the results of OLS regressions that examine the influence of aggregate level institutional 
investors (INST_INV) on absolute dividend surprise (ABS_DIV_SUR). In order to have meaningful 
regression coefficient, we multiply ABS_DIV_SUR by 1000. Models 1, 2 and 3 differ in terms of control 
variables. Model 1 controls for firm size only; whereas, Model 2 and 3 include additional control 
variables. All variable descriptions are presented in section Appendix-A. All regression models include 
Fama-French industry dummies and year dummies. Test statistics are based on robust standard error 
adjusted for clustering by firm.  Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, **, * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    INST_INV -0.1298** -0.1126* -0.0485 
 
(0.064) (0.062) (0.061) 
Log_SIZE 0.0068 0.0143 0.0144* 
 







































   
(0.016) 
Constant 1.6396*** 1.4778*** 1.2637*** 
 
(0.142) (0.139) (0.100) 
    Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 2,562 2,539 2,412 
Number of firms 330 321 307 
R-squared 0.052 0.063 0.215 







Table 8. Investment Horizon of Institutional Investors and Absolute Dividend Surprise 
Table 8 presents the results of OLS regressions that examine the influence of short-horizon 
(SHINST_INV), long-horizon (LHINST_INV) and non-short-horizon institutional investors 
(NSHINST_INV) on absolute dividend surprise (ABS_DIV_SUR). In order to have meaningful 
regression coefficient, we multiply ABS_DIV_SUR by 1000. Models 1, 2 and 3 include the effects of 
short-horizon and long-horizon institutional investors; whereas, Model 4 includes the effect of non-short-
horizon institutional investors. All variable descriptions are presented in section Appendix-A. All 
regression models include Fama-French industry dummies and year dummies. Test statistics are based 
on robust standard error adjusted for clustering by firm.  Standard errors are presented in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     LHINST_INV -0.4074*** -0.4106*** -0.3341*** 
 
 
(0.151) (0.149) (0.129) 
 SHINST_INV 0.0307 0.0665 0.0880 
 
 
(0.075) (0.070) (0.068) 
 NSHINST_INV 
   
-0.1895*** 
    
(0.073) 
Log_SIZE 0.0132 0.0190** 0.0172** 0.0116 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Log_NUMANL 
 
-0.0147 -0.0554*** -0.0552*** 
  
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Log_AGE 
 
-0.0244 0.0009 -0.0034 
  
(0.017) (0.012) (0.013) 
ATO 
 
-0.0328* -0.0243 -0.0229 
  
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
ROA 
 
0.2603 0.0517 -0.0267 
  
(0.216) (0.179) (0.174) 
GROWTH 
 
-0.0269 -0.0129 -0.0130 
  








2.0710*** 2.8234*** 2.8382*** 
  




   
(0.016) (0.016) 
Constant 1.5921*** 1.3956*** 1.2305*** 1.3144*** 
 
(0.146) (0.136) (0.094) (0.084) 
     Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 2,562 2,539 2,412 2,412 
Number of firms 330 321 307 307 
R-squared 0.055 0.067 0.220 0.218 









Table 9. Effect of Dividend Payouts on Institutional Ownership  
Table 9 presents the results of OLS regressions that examine the effects of dividend payouts (PAYOUT) 
on institutional ownership. Models 1, 2, and 3 use aggregate level institutional ownership (INST_INV), 
short-horizon institutional ownership (SHINST_INV), and long-horizon institutional ownership 
(LHINST_INV) as the dependent variables respectively. All variable descriptions are presented in section 
Appendix-A. All regression models include Fama-French industry dummies and year dummies. Test 
statistics are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering by firm.  Standard errors are 
presented in the parentheses. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  INST_INV SHINST_INV LHINST_INV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    PAYOUT -0.9508** -1.4183*** 0.1942 
 
(0.451) (0.301) (0.272) 
Log_SIZE -0.0431*** -0.0153*** -0.0008 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.002) 
Log_AGE -0.0209 -0.0232** 0.0066 
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.006) 
ATO -0.0127 0.0110 -0.0096* 
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.006) 
BETA 0.0038 0.0183 -0.0150*** 
 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.006) 
GROWTH -0.0447* -0.0019 -0.0120 
 
(0.024) (0.017) (0.009) 
ROA -0.0364 0.1146 0.0990* 
 
(0.127) (0.089) (0.057) 
Constant 1.1974*** 0.5131*** 0.2075*** 
 
(0.085) (0.060) (0.030) 
    Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 
Number of firms 321 321 321 
R-squared 0.277 0.286 0.282 












Table 10. Effect of Dividend Payouts on Institutional Ownership  
Table 10 presents the results of instrumental variable regressions that examine the effects of dividend 
payouts (PAYOUT) on institutional ownership. Dividend payout (PAYOUT) has been considered as an 
endogenous regressor. We use stock repurchase dummy (REPURCHASE) and log of number of analysts 
following a firm (Log_NUMANL) as the instruments. We use 2SLS (Panel A) and GMM (Panel B) 
techniques to check the robustness of the results. Models 1, 2, and 3 use aggregate level institutional 
ownership (INST_INV), short-horizon institutional ownership (SHINST_INV), and long-horizon 
institutional ownership (LHINST_INV) as the dependent variables respectively. All variable descriptions 
are presented in section Appendix-A. All regression models include Fama-French industry dummies and 
year dummies. Test statistics are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering by firm.  
Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Instrumental variable regression with 2SLS technique 
 
  INST_INV SHINST_INV LHINST_INV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    PAYOUT 3.1424 0.9486 1.0583 
 
(2.476) (2.006) (1.096) 
Log_SIZE -0.0413*** -0.0166*** -0.0006 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) 
Log_AGE -0.0260* -0.0276** 0.0049 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.006) 
ATO -0.0138 0.0086 -0.0095 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.006) 
BETA -0.0018 0.0188 -0.0148** 
 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.007) 
GROWTH 0.0083 0.0165 -0.0005 
 
(0.028) (0.020) (0.011) 
ROA -0.6785* -0.2967 -0.0548 
 
(0.404) (0.309) (0.188) 
Constant 1.3001*** 0.5918*** 0.2393*** 
 
(0.066) (0.051) (0.032) 
    Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic 
3.381 3.381 3.381 
p-value 0.0352 0.0352 0.0352 
    Hansen J statistic 0.118 0.766 0.014 
p-value 0.7317 0.3816 0.907 
    Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 2,248 2,248 2,248 
Number of firms 299 299 299 
R-squared 0.143 0.190 0.241 





Panel B. Instrumental variable regression with GMM technique 
 
  INST_INV SHINST_INV LHINST_INV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
46 
 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
        
PAYOUT 3.1122 1.1804 1.0884 
 
(2.474) (1.988) (1.065) 
Log_SIZE -0.0415*** -0.0160*** -0.0005 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) 
Log_AGE -0.0261* -0.0288** 0.0048 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.006) 
ATO -0.0134 0.0069 -0.0096 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.006) 
BETA -0.0014 0.0182 -0.0146** 
 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.006) 
GROWTH 0.0077 0.0177 -0.0004 
 
(0.028) (0.020) (0.011) 
ROA -0.6750* -0.3287 -0.0586 
 
(0.404) (0.307) (0.185) 
Constant 1.3018*** 0.5910*** 0.2388*** 
 
(0.066) (0.051) (0.032) 
    Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic 
3.381 3.381 3.381 
p-value 0.0352 0.0352 0.0352 
    Hansen J statistic 0.118 0.766 0.014 
p-value 0.7317 0.3816 0.907 
    Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 2,248 2,248 2,248 
Number of firms 299 299 299 
R-squared 0.145 0.170 0.238 
Adj. R-squared 0.135 0.160 0.229 
 
